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Ȩ Ȩ > ¿¬±¸¹®Çå > ±¹³» ³í¹®Áö > Çѱ¹Á¤º¸°úÇÐȸ ³í¹®Áö > Á¤º¸°úÇÐȸ³í¹®Áö (Journal of KIISE)

Á¤º¸°úÇÐȸ³í¹®Áö (Journal of KIISE)

Current Result Document : 7 / 37 ÀÌÀü°Ç ÀÌÀü°Ç   ´ÙÀ½°Ç ´ÙÀ½°Ç

ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) °ÔÀÓÀÌ·Ð ±â¹Ý ¹«¼± Åë½Å¿¡¼­ÀÇ Ä³½Ã ÇÒ´ç ±â¹ý
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) Game Theoretic Cache Allocation Scheme in Wireless Networks
ÀúÀÚ(Author) Æ®¶ó ÈÄ¿Ë Æ¼ ¸®   ±èµµÇö   È«Ãæ¼±   Tra Huong Thi Le   Do Hyeon Kim   Choong Seon Hong  
¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) VOL 44 NO. 08 PP. 0854 ~ 0859 (2017. 08)
Çѱ۳»¿ë
(Korean Abstract)
±âÁö±¹(Base Station)¿¡¼­ ÀαâÀÖ´Â ÄÜÅÙÃ÷(ºñµð¿À)¸¦ ij½ÌÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº Àü¼Û ´ë±â ½Ã°£À» ÁÙÀÏ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â È¿À²ÀûÀÎ ¹æ¹ýÀÌ´Ù. º» ³í¹®¿¡¼­´Â ÄÜÅÙÃ÷ Á¦°øÀÚ(CP)°¡ ij½Ì ÀýÂ÷¿¡ Âü¿©Çϵµ·Ï µ¿±â¸¦ ºÎ¿©Çϱâ À§ÇØ ¹«¼± ³×Æ®¿öÅ©¿¡¼­ÀÇ »çÀü Àμ¾Æ¼ºê ij½Ã ¸ÞÄ¿´ÏÁòÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇÑ´Ù. Çϳª ÀÌ»óÀÇ Infrastructure Provider(InP)¿Í ¸¹Àº CP·Î ±¸¼ºµÇ¾î ÀÖ´Â ½Ã½ºÅÛ¿¡¼­, InP´Â InPÀÇ ±âÁö±¹¿¡¼­ ij½ÃÇÏ´Â ÆÄÀÏ ¼ö¸¦ °áÁ¤Çϱâ À§ÇØ CP°¡ °æÀïÇÏ´Â µ¿¾È ¼öÀÍÀ» ±Ø´ëÈ­ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï CP¿¡ û±¸µÇ´Â °¡°ÝÀ» Á¤ÀÇÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» ¸ñÇ¥·Î ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ InP¿Í CP´Â Stackelberg °ÔÀÓÀÌ·Ð ³»¿¡¼­ °¢°¢ ¼±µµÀÚ¿Í ÃßÁ¾ÀÚ·Î Á¤ÀǵȴÙ. Backward InductionÀ» ±â¹ÝÀ¸·Î, °¢ CP°¡ °¢ ±âÁö±¹¿¡¼­ ÀÓ´ëÇÑ Ä³½Ã °ø°£ÀÇ ¾çÀ» Á¤È®ÇÏ°Ô ÃøÁ¤ÇÑ ÈÄ, ÃÖÀûÈ­ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ÇØ°áÇÔÀ¸·Î½á InP°¡ °¢ CP¸¦ ÀÓ´ëÇÏ´Â °¡°ÝÀ» °è»êÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ°ÍÀº ºñ ±ÕÀÏ °¡°Ý ü°è¸¦ °í·ÁÇÑ Á¡¿¡¼­ ±âÁ¸ ¿¬±¸¿Í Â÷ÀÌ°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ¼öÄ¡ °á°ú´Â Á¦¾È µÈ ¹æ¹ýÀ» ÅëÇØ InPÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÀÌ ±ÕÀÏ °¡°Ý Ã¥Á¤º¸´Ù ³ô´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù.
¿µ¹®³»¿ë
(English Abstract)
Caching popular videos in the storage of base stations is an efficient method to reduce the transmission latency. This paper proposes an incentive proactive cache mechanism in the wireless network to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure. The system consists of one/many Infrastructure Provider (InP) and many CPs. The InP aims to define the price it charges the CPs to maximize its revenue while the CPs compete to determine the number of files they cache at the InP¡¯s base stations (BSs). We conceive this system within the framework of Stackelberg game where InP is considered as the leader and CPs are the followers. By using backward induction, we show closed form of the amount of cache space that each CP renting on each base station and then solve the optimization problem to calculate the price that InP leases each CP. This is different from the existing works in that we consider the non-uniform pricing scheme. The numerical results show that InP¡¯s profit in the proposed scheme is higher than in the uniform pricing.
Å°¿öµå(Keyword) ij½Ã ÇÒ´ç   ½ºÅÂŬ¹ö±× °ÔÀÓ   ºñ±Õµî °¡°Ýü°è   Áßø Ä¿¹ö¸®Áö   cache allocation   Stackelberg game   non-uniform   overlapped coverage  
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