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Ȩ Ȩ > ¿¬±¸¹®Çå > ±¹³» ³í¹®Áö > Çѱ¹Á¤º¸Ã³¸®ÇÐȸ ³í¹®Áö > Á¤º¸Ã³¸®ÇÐȸ ³í¹®Áö C

Á¤º¸Ã³¸®ÇÐȸ ³í¹®Áö C

Current Result Document : 3 / 3

ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ Skein¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ¹æ¹ý
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) Side-channel Attack on the Final Round SHA-3 Candidate Skein
ÀúÀÚ(Author) ¹Ú¾Ö¼±   ¹ÚÁ¾¿¬   Çѵ¿±¹   ÀÌ¿Á¿¬   Aesun Park   Jong-Yeon Park   Dong-Guk Han   Okyeon Yi  
¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) VOL 19-C NO. 03 PP. 0179 ~ 0184 (2012. 06)
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(Korean Abstract)
NIST(National Institute of Standards and Technology)´Â SHA-2ÀÇ ´ëü ¾Ë°í¸®Áò ºÎÀç·Î SHA-3 °³¹ß ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¸¦ ÁøÇà µÇ°í ÀÖ´Â Áß ÀÌ´Ù. 2010³â ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ 5°³°¡ ¹ßÇ¥µÇ¾ú°í, SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå 5°³ÀÇ Èĺ¸¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ½Ã³ª¸®¿À°¡ Á¦¾ÈµÇ¾ú´Ù. º» ³í¹®¿¡¼­´Â SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ Áß Skein¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ½Ã³ª¸®¿À¸¦ 32ºñÆ® ·¹Áö½ºÅ͸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â ARM ChipÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿©, 8 ºñÆ®ÀÇ ºí·Ï´ÜÀ§·Î Divide and Conquer ºÐ¼®ÀÌ °¡´ÉÇÔÀ» ½ÇÇèÀ» ÅëÇØ Áõ¸íÇÑ´Ù. 9700°³ÀÇ ÆÄÇüÀ¸·Î 128ºñÆ® Å°ÀÇ ¸ðµç ºñÆ®¸¦ ãÀ» ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» ½ÇÇèÀ¸·Î °ËÁõÇÏ¿´´Ù.
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(English Abstract)
Due to the absence of an alternative algorithm SHA-2, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) is proceeding to development project of SHA-3. NIST announced five candidates of the final round at the end of 2010. Side-channel attack scenarios of five candidates for SHA-3 final round have been proposed. In this paper, we prove the possibility of the analysis against 32-bit modular addition by 8-bit blocks from our experiment on ARM chip board with a register size of 32-bit. In total we required 9700 power traces to successfully recover the 128-bit secret key for the attack against.
Å°¿öµå(Keyword) Skein Çؽ¬ÇÔ¼ö   ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý   SHA-3   Skein Hash Function   Side Channel Attack   HMAC  
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