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Current Result Document :
ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) |
SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ Skein¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ¹æ¹ý |
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) |
Side-channel Attack on the Final Round SHA-3 Candidate Skein |
ÀúÀÚ(Author) |
¹Ú¾Ö¼±
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Çѵ¿±¹
ÀÌ¿Á¿¬
Aesun Park
Jong-Yeon Park
Dong-Guk Han
Okyeon Yi
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¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) |
VOL 19-C NO. 03 PP. 0179 ~ 0184 (2012. 06) |
Çѱ۳»¿ë (Korean Abstract) |
NIST(National Institute of Standards and Technology)´Â SHA-2ÀÇ ´ëü ¾Ë°í¸®Áò ºÎÀç·Î SHA-3 °³¹ß ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¸¦ ÁøÇà µÇ°í ÀÖ´Â Áß ÀÌ´Ù. 2010³â ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ 5°³°¡ ¹ßÇ¥µÇ¾ú°í, SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå 5°³ÀÇ Èĺ¸¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ½Ã³ª¸®¿À°¡ Á¦¾ÈµÇ¾ú´Ù. º» ³í¹®¿¡¼´Â SHA-3 ÃÖÁ¾ ¶ó¿îµå Èĺ¸ Áß Skein¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý ½Ã³ª¸®¿À¸¦ 32ºñÆ® ·¹Áö½ºÅ͸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â ARM ChipÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿©, 8 ºñÆ®ÀÇ ºí·Ï´ÜÀ§·Î Divide and Conquer ºÐ¼®ÀÌ °¡´ÉÇÔÀ» ½ÇÇèÀ» ÅëÇØ Áõ¸íÇÑ´Ù. 9700°³ÀÇ ÆÄÇüÀ¸·Î 128ºñÆ® Å°ÀÇ ¸ðµç ºñÆ®¸¦ ãÀ» ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» ½ÇÇèÀ¸·Î °ËÁõÇÏ¿´´Ù.
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¿µ¹®³»¿ë (English Abstract) |
Due to the absence of an alternative algorithm SHA-2, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) is proceeding to development project of SHA-3. NIST announced five candidates of the final round at the end of 2010. Side-channel attack scenarios of five candidates for SHA-3 final round have been proposed. In this paper, we prove the possibility of the analysis against 32-bit modular addition by 8-bit blocks from our experiment on ARM chip board with a register size of 32-bit. In total we required 9700 power traces to successfully recover the 128-bit secret key for the attack against.
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Å°¿öµå(Keyword) |
Skein Çؽ¬ÇÔ¼ö
ºÎä³Î °ø°Ý
SHA-3
Skein Hash Function
Side Channel Attack
HMAC
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ÆÄÀÏ÷ºÎ |
PDF ´Ù¿î·Îµå
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