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Current Result Document : 9 / 12

ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) CFI(Control Flow Integrity) Àû¿ëÀ» ÅëÇÑ GOT(Global Offset Table) º¯Á¶ °ø°Ý ¹æÁö ¹æ¾È ¿¬±¸
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) CFI Approach to Defend against GOT Overwrite Attacks
ÀúÀÚ(Author) Á¤½ÂÈÆ   ȲÀçÁØ   ±ÇÇõÁø   ½Åµ¿±Ô   Seunghoon Jeong   Jaejoon Hwang   Hyukjin Kwon   Dongkyoo Shin  
¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) VOL 21 NO. 01 PP. 0179 ~ 0190 (2020. 02)
Çѱ۳»¿ë
(Korean Abstract)
À¯´Ð½º °è¿­ ½Ã½ºÅÛ È¯°æ¿¡¼­ GOT º¯Á¶(GOT overwrite) °ø°ÝÀº ¼ÒÇÁÆ®¿þ¾î ±ÇÇÑ Å»Ã븦 À§ÇÑ ÀüÅëÀûÀÎ Á¦¾îÈ帧 Å»Ãë ±â¹ý Áß ÇϳªÀÌ´Ù. ±× µ¿¾È GOT º¯Á¶¸¦ ¹æ¾îÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¸î °¡Áö ±â¹ýµéÀÌ Á¦¾ÈµÇ¾ú´Âµ¥, ±× Áß ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ·Îµù ´Ü°è¿¡¼­ GOT ¿µ¿ªÀ» ÀбâÀü¿ë ¼Ó¼ºÀ¸·Î ¸Þ¸ð¸® ¹èÄ¡ÇÏ¿© ½ÇÇà ½Ã°£¿¡ GOT º¯Á¶¸¦ ¿øõÀûÀ¸·Î Â÷´ÜÇÏ´Â Full Relro(Relocation Read only) ±â¹ýÀÌ °¡Àå È¿°úÀûÀÎ ¹æ¾î ±â¹ýÀ¸·Î ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ¿Ô´Ù. ÇÏÁö¸¸, Full Relro ±â¹ýÀº ·Îµù ½Ã°£ÀÇ Áö¿¬À» °¡Á®¿Í ½ÃÀÛ ¼º´É¿¡ ¹Î°¨ÇÑ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ÀÇ Àû¿ë¿¡´Â Á¦¾àÀÌ ÀÖ°í, ¶óÀ̺귯¸®¿¡ Àû¿ë½Ã ÀÇÁ¸ ¶óÀ̺귯¸®¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ¿¬¼âÀûÀÎ ·Îµù Áö¿¬ ¹®Á¦ µîÀ¸·Î ¶óÀ̺귯¸®¿¡´Â ÇöÀç Àû¿ëµÇÁö ¾Ê°í ÀÖ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ, LLVMÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ ´Ù¼öÀÇ ÄÄÆÄÀÏ·¯µéÀº Full Relro ±â¹ýÀ» ±âº» Àû¿ëÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Æ ½ÇÇàȯ°æÀÇ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥Àº GOT °ø°Ý¿¡ ¿©ÀüÈ÷ Ãë¾àÇÏ´Ù. ÀÌ ³í¹®¿¡¼­´Â ÇöÀç ÄÚµå Àç»ç¿ë °ø°Ý ¹æ¾î¸¦ À§ÇØ °¡Àå ÀûÇÕÇÑ ±â¹ýÀ¸·Î Àνĵǰí ÀÖ´Â CFI(Control Flow Integrity) ±â¹ýÀ» »ç¿ëÇÑ GOT º¸È£ ÀåÄ¡¸¦ Á¦¾ÈÇÑ´Ù. LLVMÀ» ±â¹ÝÀ¸·Î º» ±â¹ýÀ» ±¸ÇöÇÏ°í binutils-gdb ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ±×·ì¿¡ Àû¿ëÇØ º¸¾È¼º, ¼º´É, ȣȯ¼º µîÀ» Æò°¡ÇÏ¿´´Ù. º» CFI ±â¹Ý GOT º¸È£ ÀåÄ¡´Â ¿ìȸÇϱ⠾î·Æ°í, ºü¸£¸ç ±âÁ¸ ¶óÀ̺귯¸® ÇÁ·Î±×·¥°úµµ ȣȯµÇ¾î Àû¿ë°¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô´Ù.
¿µ¹®³»¿ë
(English Abstract)
In the Unix-like system environment, the GOT overwrite attack is one of the traditional control flow hijacking techniques for exploiting software privileges. Several techniques have been proposed to defend against the GOT overwrite attack, and among them, the Full Relro(Relocation Read only) technique, which blocks GOT overwrites at runtime by arranging the GOT section as read-only in the program startup, has been known as the most effective defense technique. However, it entails loading delay, which limits its application to a program sensitive to startup performance, and it is not currently applied to the library due to problems including a chain loading delay problem caused by nested library dependency. Also, many compilers, including LLVM, do not apply the Full Relro technique by default, so runtime programs are still vulnerable to GOT attacks. In this paper, we propose a GOT protection scheme using the Control Flow Integrity(CFI) technique, which is currently recognized as the most suitable technique for defense against code reuse attacks. We implemented this scheme based on LLVM and applied it to the binutils-gdb program group to evaluate security, performance and compatibility. The GOT protection scheme with CFI is difficult to bypass, fast, and compatible with existing library programs.
Å°¿öµå(Keyword) º¸¾È   Á¦¾îÈ帧 ¹«°á¼º   ¸µÅ·°ú ·Îµù   control flow integrity   GOT/PLT   linking and loading   security  
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